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UTAH
DANIEL J. H. GREENWOOD, CHRISTINE M. DURHAM,
AND KATHY WYER

Utah's Constitution

Dutinctively Unoutinctive

Utah has a relatively homogeneous population by comparison with most
American states, much of which belongs to a distinctive church-the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS, or Mormon Church) 1 with mores and origin stories that, to some degree, express the normative
and historical characteristics that distinguish peoples. One strand of Mormon historiography, for example, portrays the history of Utah as one of settlement by the Mormon people fleeing persecution in the United States
followed by extensive legal and some military tension with the federal government. 2 Distinctive Mormon religious and cultural features continue to
Daniel J. H. Greenwood is a professor of law at Hofstra University School of Law. Christine M. Durham is the chief justice of the Utah Supreme Court. Kathy Wyer is a trial attorney for the Department ofJustice. Author affiliations are for identification only. The authors
write in their private capacities, and the views presented do not reflect the positions of their
employers.
1. The percentage of the population that is LDS has dropped rapidly in the past several
decades and is now thought to be about 62 percent (Matt Canham, "Mormon Portion of
Utah Population Steadily Sinking;' Salt Lake Tribune, July 24, 2005, A10).
2. See Edwin B. Firmage and Richard C. Mangrum, Zion in the Courts: A Legal History of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 1830-1900 (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1988), 226,244. In the "Utah War" of 1857-1858, the United States responded to reports
that the Mormons were in "substantial rebellion" by sending in armed forces, accusing Mormon leader Brigham Young of treason and removing him from his position as territorial
governor. The Nauvoo League, a Mormon force that also served as the territorial militia,
fought back, burning two forts and supply trains. Later, the federal government launched a
campaign to eradicate polygamy and reduce the power of the LDS Church that by the 1880s
included barring polygamists and their supporters from serving on juries, holding public
office, and even voting. LDS leaders were imprisoned for polygamy under evidentiary rules
that apparently allowed conviction based on reputation with little more, and, in the final

MOUNTAIN WEST STATES

I

650

be influential in the state's day-to-day politics. For example, the fact that
church members tithe to support church religious, educational, and welfare
activities gives church members additional expenses, whereas the fact that
they commonly have large families gives the state a distinctive age structure,
with more children per taxpayer than any other American state. 3 As a result,
Utah's taxpayers sometimes have more needs and fewer resources than is
typical.
In addition, for the past several decades, Utah statewide politics has been
dominated by a single political party. Salt Lake City, the state's capital and
largest city, however, is an exception both demographically and politically.
Although it is the headquarters of the LDS Church, its population is more
religiously and ethnically diverse, and its voting patterns are more liberal
than in other parts of the state. As a result, the disproportionate influence of
rural voters, limited in most states by the U.S. Supreme Court's one-person,
one-vote cases, remains strong in Utah, as political power is retained by the
statewide majority outside the capital, while the Salt Lake City population
wields less influence in state government through its minority-party representatives.4
The distinctiveness of Utah as a state does not at first glance appear to find
expression in the Utah Constitution, the text of which reflects the special
history of Utah mainly negatively in the various concessions the Mormon
leaders of the original territory made in order to win statehood. These include the state's name, which derives from the name of a local Indian tribe
rather than the Mormon name for the region, Deseret, and, most important
for purposes of gaining statehood, the constitution's ordinance, which purports to "forever prohibit" "polygamous or plural marriages" (Article III,
Section 1).
stages, the church was disincorporated and threatened with expropriation of most of its extensive property holdings.
3. See Pam Perlich, "Population Growth in Utah, 1970-1995;' available at http:! /governor
.utah.gov/ <lea/Library.html. According to the 2000 U.S. Census, 32.2 percent of Utahns were
under the age of eighteen, compared to 25.7 percent in the nation as a whole. Utah's 2002
birthrate among women between the ages of eighteen and forty-four was 90.6 percent (National Center for Health Statistics, http:/ /www.cdc.gov/nchs/births.htm).
4. Utah was no exception to the usual American practices. The original Utah Constitution provided for excessive representation of rural counties, and the unfairness grew worse
as the population urbanized and the legislature failed to redistrict. Redistricting occurred in
Utah only twice before the courts took action in 1965. See Jean Bickmore White, Charter for
Statehood: The Story of Utah's State Constitution (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press,
1996), 96, 97. The state constitution was amended to conform to federal constitutional requirements in 1988. Rural counties are still given formal overrepresentation in the current
rules regarding initiatives and referenda, although this is probably less significant than the
power that accrues as a result of single-party domination.
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Even the compilation method of the Utah Constitution lacks distinction;
Utah, like other states that entered the Union in the late nineteenth century, adopted many of the provisions of its original 1896 constitution from
those of its sister states. One commentator has accordingly concluded that
"it is impossible to say that the Utah Constitution ... was drafted by Utahns
for Utah:' 5 As this author acknowledges, however, Utah's 1896 constitution
was unique, if not in the text of its provisions, then as the product of Utah's
"unusual history and experience" in struggling to become a state and to draft
an acceptable statehood charter. 6

THE STRUGGLE FOR UTAH'S STATEHOOD AND CONSTITUTION

The nearly fifty years from Congress's designation of a Utah Territory in
1850 (Organic Act, chap. 5, 9 Stat. 453) to its authorization of Utah's statehood in 1894 (Enabling Act, chap. 138, 28 Stat. 107) saw a series of disputes

between the local population and the federal government. The experience
of this prolonged controversy and the ultimate necessity of the territory's
achieving some manner of reconciliation or accommodation with the nation as a whole in order to gain entry as a state resulted in a state constitution that was intentionally aimed at defining a governing body and its participants in a way that would not only include the population that was
already present but also assure potential immigrants, as well as the federal
government, that Utah was mainstream America. At the same time, the ongoing existence of the LDS Church as a decision-making and service system
for its members has continued to demonstrate that a seemingly run-of-themill constitution is entirely compatible with a quite unusual polity.7
The members of the LDS Church who originally settled in the Salt Lake
5. John J. Flynn, "Federalism and Viable State Government: The History of Utah's Constitution;' Utah Law Review 10 (1966): 311,324.
6. Thus, the Utah Constitution may be an example of the phenomenon explored in Jorge
Luis Borges's short story "Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote," in which a modern author creates a new version of Don Quixote, dramatically different from the original even
though the words are identical. See Borges, Ficciones, trans. Anthony Kerrigan (New York:
Grove Press, 1962).
7. This was so to a degree even before the territory was forced to succumb to federal demands. Indeed, the first proposed constitution of the "State of Deseret;' written in 1849
"while the territory was governed as a theocracy;' guaranteed freedom of religion in familiar American strong terms (White, Charter for Statehood, 21). At the time, the Mormons referred to their polity as "The Kingdom of God and His Laws with the Keys and Powers Thereof, and Judgment in the Hands of His Servants, Ahman Christ," and it was governed by a
Council of Fifty, understood to be the "political arm of the Kingdom of God when the Lord
finally established his Kingdom on Earth" (Firmage and Mangrum, Zion in the Courts, 7).

MOUNTAIN WEST STATES

I 652

valley in 1847 had in fact fled to Mexican territory in order to escape the state
regimes of New York, Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois. In the early years, the Mormon Church understood itself not only as a faith community but also as a
national community with a distinctive history and communal character. 8 At
the beginning, Mormons experimented with creating a distinctive new Zion,
complete with its own alphabet, extensive communal economic enterprises,
and separate legal system (distinctive in both procedure and substantive law)
to emphasize their separation from American norms in their new "State of
Deseret." 9 Even after these experiments were largely abandoned, the LDS
community maintained a sense of itself as a self-governing community with
a shared history and mythology different from its neighbors. 10
After Mexico ceded territory that included the Salt Lake settlement to the
United States in 1848, the community determined that the best way to preserve its autonomy was to form its own state government. Over the next
thirty-nine years, six separate attempts to draft a state constitution were rejected by the federal government. In contrast to the early Mormon experiments with forms of church-based governance, hostility to law, and collective (or church) ownership of enterprise (which continued in various forms
for most of the territorial period), 11 the various draft constitutions show little originality. As one commentator wrote, "Although the social development of the Mormons varied from the usual cultural patterns, their political development [as reflected in their proposed constitutions] tended to
parallel that of the rest of the nation." 12 Perhaps the most distinctively particularistic feature of the early attempts was the name of the proposed state,
8. See generally Firmage and Mangrum, Zion in the Courts.
9. Ibid., xiii, 14; David L. Bigler, Forgotten Kingdom: The Mormon Theocracy in the American West, 1847-1896 (Spokane:Arthur H. Clark, 1998), 56. In the early years of settlement in
Utah, Mormon leaders preached economic self-sufficiency, going so far as to organize a boycott of all "gentile" (that is, non-LDS) merchants in 1868 and the creation of a churchcontrolled alternative, the Zion's Cooperative Mercantile Institute, which remains a significant presence in the Utah economy today. The church and its leaders encouraged members
to turn their property over to the church for collective operation. At the peak of the "United Order" phase, some towns were entirely collectivized, even to the point of common dining rooms. Collective control diminished in the course of the federal antipolygamy campaign, and by 1884 many of the remnants had been spun off from the church as cooperatives,
some of which remain important. The church's expansive modern social-welfare operation
may also be a remnant of this era. See Firmage and Mangrum, Zion in the Courts, 223, 317.
10. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983).
u. See White, Charter for Statehood, 23, 40, describing the "Ghost Government of Deseret" -the Mormon power controlling the territory despite the official rules-in the late
1850s and the theocratic shadow government in Utah as late as the 1880s.
12. Martin Berkeley Hickman, Utah Constitutional Law (Ph.D. diss., University of Utah,
1954), 73.
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Deseret, taken from Mormon scripture. By the sixth ·round, in 1882, the convention gave up, accepting that the state, like the territory, would be named
after a local Indian tribe, the Utes. 13
From the earliest drafts, the proposed constitutions are most notable in
their conformity to existing state constitutional norms; they simply ignore
most of the distinctive Mormon institutions of the territorial period. There
is no mention of the famous general assembly of the "Ghost State of Deseret;' which had first convened in anticipation of the federal government's acceptance of Utah's third-draft constitution in 1862 and continued meeting
after that constitution failed and Utah remained a territory rather than a
state. The Ghost assembly convened for several days each year for six years
to reenact "in behalf of Deseret the laws passed for the Territory of Utah." 14
There is no discussion of distinctive Mormon economic institutions, including church or cooperatively run irrigation projects, mills, land distribution, and city planning, or the communal "United Order" movement in
which LDS members were encouraged to "consecrate" their property by
turning it over to communal authorities. Similarly, the proposed constitutions do not reflect in any obvious way the church's historical antipathy toward being bound by the common law. Although Mormons maintained distinctive court systems and procedures for the entire prestate period, these
institutions are not mentioned in the constitutions. 15
13. Flynn, "History of Utah's Constitution;' 319. The name change was first proposed in
the 1872 constitutional convention (Dale L. Morgan, The State ofDeseret [Logan: Utah State
University Press, 1987), 112-13).
14. Morgan, The State of Deseret, 96-101 (quote on 100).
15. After the federal courts were organized in 1855, the LDS Church barred members from
using those "foreign" and "ungodly" courts, at least for civil actions between church members, and instead directed Mormons to use church-based procedures emphasizing resolution of conflict through compromise (often imposed by church authorities) and enforced
by disfellowship or excommunication. See Firmage and Mangrum, Zion in the Courts, 2, 15,
214-16, 218, 263-67, 288. Church courts insisted on their exclusive jurisdiction or supremacy or both until well into the 1890s, and the church did not officially recommend that members use the civil courts to collect debts until 1908. In the event of conflict between church
decisions and civil court decisions, the church courts regularly required members to waive
their legal rights and follow church rulings. Additionally, the Mormon-controlled territorial
legislature created locally staffed "probate courts" (with jurisdiction extending far beyond
probate) that did not follow common-law procedures or precedents; these courts continued
to be influential at least to statehood. These courts abolished the forms of pleading and the
formal authority of precedent, barred attorneys from collecting fees, required lawyers to present facts adverse to their clients, and placed a strong emphasis on resolution of conflict
through compromise rather than final adjudication; they thus resembled the Mormon
Church adjudicative system more than traditional common-law courts. Although the probate courts formally were part of the federal and territorial judicial systems, in practice
church members were expected to take appeals to the parallel church system.
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The federal government remained unappeased by the unexceptional
character of these proposed constitutions, however, in the face of national
hostility toward the Mormon practice of plural marriage, or polygamy,
which emerged as the primary obstacle to statehood. Only after the LDS
Church officially disavowed the practice in 1890, in the face of federal actions to confiscate church property and divest church members who practiced or espoused polygamy of various political rights, did Congress finally
authorize the constitutional convention that would draft what became
Utah's 1896 constitution.
By that time, the local population itself had also changed. New Mormon
converts had continued to settle in the territory, but so had a substantial
number of non-Mormons as well, though the latter remained a minority.
The divide between the two groups was expressed through both economic
and political competition, with non-Mormons traditionally opposing statehood out of fear of the church's dominance. By the time of the 1895 constitutional convention, however, all parties recognized the necessity of cooperation, both in order to succeed in the final task required to achieve
statehood and in order to bring prosperity to the new state. The 107 delegates to the convention included not only prominent LDS leaders but also
29 non-Mormons, or "gentiles," one of whom was a Jew. 16

THE THEMES OF ACCEPTANCE AND INCLUSIVENESS
EXPRESSED IN UTAH'S CONSTITUTION

Thus, whereas Donald S. Lutz has suggested that all state constitutions
seek to create or define a people, the 1896 Utah Constitution may be considered one of the more intentional attempts to do so. Of course, like all
American states, Utah lacks certain basic prerequisites for defining a people.
It lacks control over its immigration policy and so cannot control the composition of its citizenry. Just as important, American norms of governmental neutrality leave states with only limited control over the processes of cultural production that differentiate one people from another and the extent
to which a governing group can use governmental power to impose its cultural norms (including its views of history, language, and behavior) on all
inhabitants of the polity. Still, Utah's relative isolation, its unusually uniform
population in the early years, the Mormon population's sense of itself as a
quasi-national community with a distinctive history of persecution and sue-

16. White, Charter for Statehood, 50. Mormon tradition refers to all non-Mormons as
"gentiles:'
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cess, and the state's own self-conscious struggle for self-realization make the
Lutz framework unusually appropriate.
Two concerns were prominent in the minds of the delegates and, to a large
extent, remain manifest in the resulting text as it continues to exist today.
The first was the desire to ensure Congress's acceptance of this seventh draft
of the Utah Constitution and thus bring to an end the long wait for statehood. The federal Enabling Act for Utah had specified that the new state
constitution must include certain provisions that would be "irrevocable
without the consent of the United States;' including a provision "that polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited:' 17 Article III of the Utah
Constitution for the most part simply incorporates the language of the provisions as set forth in the Enabling Act. In debating whether the Enabling
Act actually required that criminal penalties be imposed on the act of polygamy, the delegates concluded that they would meet federal requirements
by adopting the federal language stating that "polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited." 18 The question of whether this was sufficient
arose again when the delegates reached the provision ensuring that the territorial laws then in effect would remaiq. in effect at statehood. Responding
to some delegates' concern that the territorial law criminalizing polygamy
was preempted by a federal statute and was thus invalid, the convention inserted the statement that the law that "defines and imposes penalties for
[polygamy] is hereby declared to be in force in the State of Utah" (Article
XXIV, Section 2). 19
Aside from adhering to the Enabling Act's specific requirements, the
delegates also relied on the principle that language imported from other
states' constitutions, which Congress had already approved, would serve as
a safe harbor, avoiding any potential for federal criticism. Such borrowing
"seemed reassuring, not a sign of lack of creativity." 20 Thus, much of the·
1896 Utah Constitution was taken from other state constitutions. 21 The
statement in Article I, Section 24, that "frequent recurrence to fundamental

17. Chap. 138, Sec. 3, 28 Stat. 107.
18. Proceedings of the Utah Constitutional Convention,
ing, 1895), 1:811; statement of Mr. Eichnor.
19. Ibid., 2:1736-37.

2

vols. (Salt Lake City: Star Print-

20. White, Charter for Statehood, 52. That the delegates were self-conscious in following
this practice is revealed in a contemporary newspaper account, in which one delegate facetiously stated that if a provision were not exactly copied, "I am afraid then we should not
adopt it. We must have the exact words of some state constitution" (quoted in White, Charter for Statehood, 77).
21. Flynn, "Viable State Government," 323, citing Nevada, Washington, Illinois, and New
York as the most common sources for Utah's constitutional provisions.

MOUNTAIN WEST STATES

/

656

principles is essential to the security of individual rights and the perpetuity
of free government:' for example, was copied from the Washington Constitution.22
The delegates' second major concern in drafting the 1896 Utah Constitution was to promote an aura of inclusiveness. They sought not only to further ease the divide between Mormons and non-Mormons already resident
but also to reassure those contemplating settlement in Utah that they could
comfortably live and do business there. The desire to promote the new state
as an attractive destination for those who could contribute to its economic
prosperity was common in the West. Utah's concern, however, was particularly acute given its negative national image throughout the era of controversy over polygamy and church control. Thus, although the Mormon people's desire for statehood may have originally been motivated in large part
by a desire for autonomy, the years of struggle ultimately led to a genuine
effort to join the mainstream. The extent to which the inclusiveness expressed in Utah's constitution has been realized in state politics has been a
subject of some controversy, but there is no question that the constitutional ideal remains of considerable significance. Although the LDS Church has
occasionally wielded political influence overtly, these occasions have been
quite rare, leaving the question of why the state has attained such political
uniformity a matter of speculation. The constitution is to an extent responsible for structuring political debate-for example, through winner-take-all
elections and electoral boundaries that tend to increase the power of local
majorities and preclude serious discussion of issues that larger statewide minorities might be able to put on the table-but there is little evidence available, in the.proceedings of the constitutional convention or elsewhere, that
convention delegates who were church members deliberately set out to construct a constitution that would facilitate church domination.
Not surprisingly, in light of the polygamy controversy, the issue of freedom of religion and conscience received attention in the 1896 constitution,
even beyond the requirements of the federal Enabling Act. The standard features of the American political theory oflimited government offered a path
to compromise the competing goals of autonomy and inclusiveness that the
Utah delegates followed apparently without controversy. As one author has
observed, "Almost every imaginable protection for religious freedom and injunction against the union of church and state has been included" in Utah's
constitution, ranging from the guarantee of the right "to worship according
to the dictates" of one's conscience (Article I, Section 1) to the prohibition
of religious tests for admission in public schools (Article X, Section 8) and
of public aid for the support of church-controlled schools (Article X, Sec22.

Proceedings of the Convention, 1:362.
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tion 9). 23 Tellingly, the Utah Constitution is the only state constitution to
explicitly forbid "any church [from] dominat[ing] the State or interfer[ing]
with its functions" (Article I, Section 4).24 Further, the delegates' debates
clearly indicate that nonreligious belief systems are included within the understanding of freedom of conscience. 25 The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted the state constitution's provisions on religious freedom and freedom of conscience, in light of Utah's history, as evidencing a strict policy of
neutrality between religion and nonreligion. 26 This perhaps reflects an ongoing desire to appear all-inclusive and mainstream even as the relationships between state and church, the LDS religion and minority religions, and
religion and nonreligion remain relevant to the state's politics.
Other indications of the delegates' intent to make the state attractive to
potential settlers appear in the debates over the education and corporations
articles. In both of these articles, the desire to promote the state's image had
to be balanced against practical concerns about available state resources. In
regard to education, one delegate called the provision ensuring public funding of the common schools (Article X, Section 3) "an advertisement worth
more to Utah than all the money that has been expended in advertising this
Territory in the last year." 27 However, the delegates ultimately acknowledged
that the state university and agricultural college could not afford to operate
without charging tuition, and state-funded high schools were not provided
for in the Education Article until 1906.28 A surprisingly long debate occurred over the location of the state university and agricultural college, 29 re-

23. Lester J. Mazor, "Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State Constitution:' Utah Law Review
(1966): 326, 331.
24. As Mazor points out, this provision is unusual in that it appears to place a direct prohibition on churches rather than imposing a limitation on government powers, as is customary for bill-of-rights provisions (ibid., 332). See Proceedings of the Convention, 1:240,
statement of Mr. Kimball acknowledging the role of the declaration of rights as "declaring
what the State can do:•
25. Proceedings of the Convention, 1:240, statement of Mr. Van Horne. The delegates also
contemplated extending the prohibition on state support of religious institutions to parallel nonreligious institutions, such as those controlled by Freemasons or atheists, but ultimately rejected the idea (1:245-48).
26. Society ofSeparationists, Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 937-38 (Utah 1993). Of course,
the constitutional language can have only limited influence on the casual thoughtlessnessgenerally manifesting itself in an assumption that the entire population, rather than somewhat more than half, observes LDS practices-that is the main practical limit to an aura of
inclusiveness in modern Utah. Those are issues of empathy that play out in the political
branches.
27. Proceedings of the Convention, 1:388, statement of Mr. Goodwin.
28. White, Charter for Statehood, 71-72, 94.
29. Proceedings of the Convention, 1:368, 2:1231, 1310.
10
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sulting in the schools remaining in separate locations rather than merging
into a single institution (Article X, Section 4). Both the state university and
the agricultural college were granted "perpetuation" of all their existing
"rights, immunities and franchises," which arguably included a large degree
of autonomy and academic freedom from legislative interference. 30 Similarly, the original Article X, Section 9 (repealed in 1986), barred legislative
interference in textbook selection (more likely to preserve school board than
teacher autonomy).
The Corporations Article (Article XII), which was substantially eliminated in 1993, recognized the state's desire to encourage industrial development
while also reining in the corporate power emerging in the late nineteenth
century. Its detail reveals the delegates' concern that "future legislatures ...
be able to deal with the powerful corporations they hoped to attract:' The
resulting "balancing act" included provisions mainly reflecting struggles
from earlier in the nineteenth century elsewhere in the United States. 31
Thus, we find a ban on special incorporation acts (Article XII, Section 1) and
several other forms of special acts (Article VI, Section 26, barring special
laws generally), which had been the source of much corruption in midnineteenth-century legislatures. 32 Two provisions react to specific U.S. Supreme Court decisions: one responds to the Dartmouth College case 33 by
explicitly retaining for the legislature the power to modify corporate charters, 34 and another extends the logic of Charles River Bridge by barring irrevocable franchises. 35 Reflecting the midcentury railroad-financing crises,
30. The university's constitutional autonomy was limited in the case of University of Utah
v. Shurtleff(2006 Utah 51,144 P.3d 1109 [Utah 2006]), where the court rejected the university's ban on firearms.
31. White, Charter for Statehood, 74.
.
32. The fear of corruption can also be seen elsewhere in the original constitution. For example, Article VI, Section 28, originally Section 29, bars the legislature from delegating to
any"special commission, private corporation or association, any power to make ... any municipal improvement ... to levy taxes ... or to perform any municipal function:' Article XII,
Section 17, repealed, barred corporate officers or holders of franchise from serving as officials of the municipality granting the franchise. Article VI, Section 30, repealed in 1972, originally barred bonuses on government contracts.
33. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
34. Proceedings of the Convention, 2:1466-67. Although the relevant provision in Article
XII was repealed in 1993, Article I, Section 23, serves the same function, stating that "no law
shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise, privilege or immunity." See ibid., 1:366,
statement of Mr. Evans, referring to Dartmouth College in connection with Article I, Section 23.
35. Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors ofWarren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420
(1837). According to Article XII, Section 11, repealed, franchises may be taken for public use.
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in which local governments had competed for railroad lines by extending
credit and financing with disastrous consequences, the constitution bars all
lending of public credit for private undertakings. 36 A residual general suspicion of the corporate form can also be seen in provisions designed to limit the life of a corporation, 37 limiting the scope of the internal-affairs doctrine, 38 limiting the ability of corporations to evade liability by certain
formal transactions, 39 providing for double liability for bank shareholders,40 and constitutionalization of the ultra vires doctrine, meant to restrict
corporations to limited purposes. 41 The convention also debated, but did not
adopt, a general bar on "bounties" or other inducements to attract industry. 42
Presaging Utah's later labor struggles (Industrial Workers of the World
leader Joe Hill was hanged in Salt Lake City in 1915), the original constitution's inclusiveness extended to the working class. The constitution included specific bars on the use of Pinkertons as strikebreakers and blacklists of
union organizers43 and (contra Lochner) 44 provided that regulation of the
conditions of labor was within the police power. 45 Finally, the constitution
contained both a general provision barring "combinations" to control the
price of agricultural, commercial, or manufacturing products (but, in con36. Article VI, Section 29, originally Section 31, was amended to allow universities to invest in research-based spin-offs. Cf. Hickman, Utah Constitutional Law, 19, describing 1837
crises and the suspicions of legislatures that resulted.
37. Article XII, Section 3, repealed, barred the legislature from extending corporate franchises. In 1870, Utah territorial law provided for a maximum duration for a corporation of
twenty-five years. In 1880, the period was extended to fifty years. And in 1901, it was again
extended, this time to one hundred years (Keetch v. Cordner, 90 Utah 423, 62 P.2d 273 [Utah
1936]). Perpetual duration was permitted only in 1957 (1957 Utah Laws, chap. 23, sec. 1). Current law provides for perpetual duration (Utah Stat. 16-10a-302).
38. Article XII, Section 6, repealed, limited privileges of foreign corporations to those
granted to domestic ones.
39. Article XII, Section 7, repealed, barred a corporation from leasing or alienating any
franchise so as to relieve the leased or alienated property from the liabilities of the corporation.
40. Article XII, Section 18, repealed, imposed double liability for bank shareholders until an amendment in 1941.
41. Article XII, Section 10, repealed, restricted corporations to their stated purposes.
42. Proceedings of the Convention, 1:899-90, 904.
43. Article XII, Section 16, repealed, barred Pinkertons. Article XII, Section 19, amended
to remove criminality, bars blacklists. Article XVI, Section 4, bars exchanges of blacklists.
44. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
45. Article XVI, Section 1, says the legislature shall protect the rights of labor. Article XVI,
Section 3, bars the "political and commercial control of employees;' labor and child labor in
mines, and convict labor. Article XVI, Section 6, provides for an eight-hour day on public
works and permits health and safety regulation in factories and mines.
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trast to the common law, not workers) 46 and specific rules to limit railroad
exploitation of their customers.47
A further signifier of the Utah Constitution's self-conscious inclusiveness
is the absence of a provision prohibiting the sale or use of alcohol. Though
Mormon doctrine prohibited alcohol and some delegates supported including Prohibition in the 1896 constitution, the convention ultimately rejected the idea, partly out of the desire to stimulate local sugar production
and partly out of the recognition that Prohibition would simply be impracticable.48
Other provisions of the 1896 constitution firmly situate it in its time and
place. Article XVII, Section 1, confirming existing individual water rights,
provided that the rights are "for any useful or beneficial purpose;' was the
product of extensive controversy over the relationship between private
property interests and the recognition of water as a limited resource in the
West. 49 The requirement in Article XI, Section 6, that municipal corporations preserve waterworks and water rights for the benefit of their inhabitants demonstrates the same concern. Provisions addressing the protection
of state forests (Article XVIII, Section 1) and the holding of public lands in
trust for the people (Article XX, Section 1) similarly have particular relevance in a western state where a high percentage of the territory remains unpopulated, undeveloped, and under federal or state control. The progressive
values evident in many state constitutions of the late nineteenth century are
apparent in the Labor Article (Article XVI), in the already-discussed Education Article (Article X) (which originally included a provision, Section 11,
requiring teaching of the metric system), and in provisions, now repealed,
that required establishment of state-funded "reformatory and penal institutions, and those for the benefit of the insane, blind, deaf and dumb, and such
other institutions as the public good may require" (Article XIX, Section 2).
In one highly significant aspect, the original Utah Constitution varied
from the dominant spirit of its times. After the "longest fight in the conven-

46. Article XII, Section 20, an antitrust provision, was amended to include reference to
the "free market system:' to explicitly reference political power as opposed to merely consumer price-manipulation justification of antitrust laws and to remove an implicit distinction between unions and producer combinations.
47. Article XII, Section 15, repealed, authorized the legislature to establish passenger and
freight tariffs. Article XII, Section 12, declared railroads common carriers. Article XII, Section 13, barred railroad consolidations. Article XII, Section 14, ensured taxability of railroad
rolling stock.
48. White, Charter for Statehood, 80-82; Proceedings of the Convention, 2:1439. Following
the federal lead, a Prohibition section was added to the Utah Constitution in 1919 and repealed in 1934 (Article XXII, Section 3).
49. White, Charter for Statehood, 78.
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tion" and despite fears that it might endanger congressional approval, so
women's suffrage won. Moreover, using text borrowed from the Wyoming
Constitution, the 1896 constitution included one of the earliest guarantees
of equal rights for women (Article IV, Section 1), providing that "male and
female citizens of this State shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious
rights and privileges." 51 Unfortunately, the clarity of this language was
promptly marred by a 1915 supreme court decision holding that, the words
notwithstanding, this provision did not bar a road poll tax that applied only
to men, because "such a [differential] classification [of men and women]
has ... always been made and enforced from time immemorial, and ... it is
a natural and proper one to make" not barred by the express language of the
constitution. 52 The constitution also omitted a literacy requirement for enfranchisement, 53 in contrast to other states that were beginning to use this
as a device to exclude immigrants and former slaves from political participation.

DEFINING GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE

Of course, in addition to its role in ensuring statehood and in promoting
the concept of Utah's inclusiveness, the Utah Constitution also establishes
the structure of state government. It is in this regard that one scholar criticizes the original 1896 constitution as exhibiting a general hostility toward
the authority and role of state government. Of particular concern was the
dispersion of executive powers among an "executive 'troika"'-the governor, secretary of state, and attorney general-who together constituted the
Utah Board of Examiners, responsible for examining all claims against the
state (Article VII, Section 13, repealed). 54 Other executive tasks were performed by other specifically empowered boards composed of the governor
and other executive officials. Most of the provisions establishing such
50. Ibid., 54.
51. It is worth noting that the Utah Territory had provided for female suffrage, but this

right was repealed by the federal government during the polygamy controversy.
52. Salt Lake City v. Wilson, 46 Utah 60,148 P. 1104 (Utah 1915). Cf. Dred Scottv. Sandford,
60 U.S. 393 (1857), similarly using "original intent" and long-standing practices to rule that
constitutional provision cannot mean what its words say. Interestingly, the convention itself
had rejected an explicit bar on "discrimination in wages on account of sex;' suggesting that
the delegates as well were unwilling to confront the full implications of the general principles they wrote into law (White, Charter for Statehood, 76).
53. As one delegate stated, "It is bad enough to be ignorant without being punished for
it" (White, Charter for Statehood, 57).
54. Flynn, "Viable State Government;' 324-25, 317; White, Charter for Statehood, 63.
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boards, with the exception of the Utah Board of Pardons and Parole (Article VII, Section 12), were repealed in 1981, with further amendments occurring in 1993. The executive branch retains its decentralized character, however, particularly due to the status of the state attorney general, a separate
elected executive official vested with the role of "legal adviser of the State officers" (Article VII, Sections 1 and 16). 55
The Legislative Department Article (Article VI) establishes a part-time
legislature that meets for a limited period beginning in January, originally
for sixty days every two years, and currently for forty-five days every year
(Sections 2 and 16). In keeping with the wariness of the legislature evidenced
by this short term, the restrictions on special legislation (Section 26), and
the requirement that each bill contain only one subject clearly stated in the
title (Section 22), the constitution was amended in 1900 to provide for the
initiative and referendum (Section 1). 56 The article sets forth procedural requirements for election and service oflegislators (Sections 3-8 and 13), the
passage of legislation (Sections 11-12, 14-16, 22, and 24-26), and the impeachment of executive officers (Sections 17-20) and imposes rules for setting legislators' salaries (Section 9). Originally, it provided for a decennial
census and redistricting, but apparently this requirement was simply ignored, and it was eventually repealed. 57 This article specifically prohibits the
legislature from authorizing "any game of chance, lottery or gift enterprise"
(Section 27), and Utah remains one of only two states (the other being
Hawaii) that retains such a restriction. 58
The Judicial Department Article (Article VIII) provides for a supreme
court and district courts, whose members were originally to be elected, but,
since 1985, have been appointed by the governor and then retained through
retel).tion elections every ten years (for supreme court justices) or shorter
terms (for other judges) (Sections 8-9). Along with the change in the
method of choosing judges, the 1985 revision established a judicial council
with administrative authority for the state courts (Section 12) and a judicial
conduct commission to handle disputes over judges' misconduct (Section
13). Perhaps the most interesting clause regarding the courts appears not in
this article but in the Utah Declaration of Rights, namely, the Open Courts
55. See Scott M. Matheson Jr., "Constitutional Status and Role of the State Attorney General:' University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy 6 (1993): 1, 6.
56. It was modified in 1998 and 1999 to require a supermajority for changes to hunting
regulations. White notes that the convention considered copying such a provision from the
Swiss Constitution but rejected the proposal ( Charter for Statehood, 52). The later amendment appears similar to those adopted contemporaneously in several other U.S. states.
57. Hickman, writing in 1954, notes that no redistricting had taken place since 1931 ( Utah

Constitutional Law, 91-92).
58. White, Charter for Statehood, 66.
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Clause (Article I, Section 11), which provides an open textured right of redress of injury that has generated much judicial interpretation.
Aside from the establishment of certain public educational institutions in
Article X, the state's government framework is made complete with the provision in Article XI for counties (Sections 1-5), municipal corporations
(Section 5), special service districts (Section 7), and other government entities, as established by the legislature (Section 8). The constitution puts most
of the responsibility for imposing specific requirements on such entfties in
the hands of the legislature.

AMENDMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR UTAH'S
CONSTITUTIONAL FUTURE

The Utah Constitution provides that it may be amended when two-thirds
of each legislative house vote in favor of the amendment and the change is
then approved by a majority of voters in the next election (Article XXIII).
In addition, the Utah legislature established the Constitutional Revision
Commission for the purpose of advising the governor and the legislature regarding proposed constitutional amendments. 59 Though Utah has not been
as active in amending its constitution as some states, a number of changes
have been noted above. Some additional amendments over the past hundredplus years are of particular interest, with some of them remaining the subject of considerable controversy.
Several amendments have resulted from the practice of constitutionalizing
fiscal rules. The original constitution contained specific dollar-denominated
limits on debt and legislative pay that eventually became intolerable (Article VI, Section 9; Article XIV, Section 1). In contrast, the original provisions
on revenue and taxation were quite simple but have been repeatedly amended to dedicate tax-revenue streams to particular purposes and to constitutionalize various exemptions. 6 For example, the gasoline tax is to be used
entirely for highways, driver education, and traffic law enforcement and apparently may not be used even for other transportation needs or mitigation
of the detrimental effects of overreliance on automobiles, whereas the income tax is dedicated entirely to public and higher education (Article XIII,
Section 5).
For the past third of a century or more, several amendments to the Utah

°

59. Utah Code Ann. Sections 63-54-1 to 63-54-9.
60. White, Charter for Statehood, 67, Bo, 93. These currently include authorization for partial or full property tax exemptions for military veterans and their widows, the poor, agricultural land and equipment, and residential property (Article XIII, Section 3).
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Constitution have reflected national right-wing political trends with little
distinctive Utah or Mormon content. Perhaps the best examples of this
tendency are the gun control, victims' rights, and heterosexual marriage
amendments. In 1983, the provision guaranteeing the right to bear arms (Article I, Section 6) was amended to make explicit that the right is an individual right and not a right of the militia or the people collectively. 61 The
amendment appears to have been a reaction to a Utah Supreme Court decision adopting the mainstream view of the U.S. Constitution's Second
Amendment,62 and to reflect to some degree the concerns and language of
the national gun-rights movement under the influence of the National Rifle Association. 63 Interestingly, although the amendment defines the right
in extremely broad language (the "individual right ... to keep and bear arms
for security and defense ... as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be
infringed"), its operational language makes the amendment entirely precatory ("Nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful
use of arms"). Thus, the import of the provision appears to lie largely in the
hands of the Utah legislature. Given the amendment's conscious replication
of the U.S. Constitution,s "keep and bear arms" language, originalist interpreters may also conclude that the "arms" in question are only those that
would have been held by ordinary citizens in the colonial period.
In 1992, the bulk of the original Article XII governing corporations was
repealed, replaced with verbatim adoption by statute of the Revised Model
Business Corporations Act, a national document that shares little of the
original Utah Constitution's fears of corporate political dominance or economic abuse.
In 1994, the Victim Rights Amendment was added, again as part of a national movement to ensure crime victims' right to be present and heard at
felony trials and to ensure that character evidence is admissible in noncap- .
ital sentencing proceedings.
The Utah definition-of-marriage amendment similarly reflects national
movements rather than a particular Utah issue. In 2004, Utah and many other states changed their constitutions to ward off a feared threat that courts
61. The prior text was: "The people have the right to bear arms for their security and defense, but the Legislature may regulate the exercise of this right by law." The amended text
states: "The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of
self, family, others, property or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of
arms:'
62. See State v. Vlacit 645 P.2d 677 (Utah 1982), which holds that the Utah legislature can
constitutionally ban aliens from obtaining arms licenses.
63. See M. Truman Hunt, "The Individual Right to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?" Utah Law Review, no. 4 (1986): 751,752.
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would require recognition of gay marriages. The Utah legislature and voters added Section 29 to Article I's declaration of rights, stating that "marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a woman" and that
"no other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a
marriage or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect." The effect of the new Section 29 is not yet clear. In particular, the meaning of the
second clause was hotly disputed during the enactment campaign, with proponents contending that it was merely meant to prevent "marriage under
another name" and opponents suggesting that it might bar equal treatment
of unmarried couples or even require eliminating well-established legal
rights. Predictably, following enactment, positions have shifted. As this
chapter was written, an out-of-state antihomosexual group was seeking to
use the second clause to challenge the City of Salt Lake's policy of granting
employment benefits to domestic partners of employees, even if not married or eligible to be married. If Section 29 is held to have substantive
meaning, it will certainly be challenged as a violation of the federal equalprotection clause, since it would then deny legal privileges to some.citizens
that are granted to othe;s with no obvious basis other than invidious discrimination.
Regardless of the legal effects of Section 29, however, it clearly marks a
dramatic step in the ongoing American project of creating an inclusive,
democratic polity. For the first time since the demise of the antimiscegenation laws, some American states, including Utah, are explicitly declaring the
policy of the state to be to bar certain citizens from marrying others and explicitly taking a stand in favor of maintaining long-standing patterns of
discrimination against disfavored groups of citizens. Ironically, Utah's adoption of this trend indicates a reversal of the 1896 constitution's emphasis of
inclusiveness even as it continues Utah's efforts to join the mainstream. This
new constitutional provision also happens to coincide with the official position of the LDS Church. Meanwhile, at the same time that gay marriage
has become an issue, the recent renewal of criminal prosecutions of polygamists64 has revived the question of what the Utah Constitution's religiousfreedom guarantees mean when juxtaposed with the ordinance's explicit
"prohibition" of polygamy. 65 It seems that Utah's distinctive history continues to play a role in shaping its otherwise undistinctive constitution.

64. Several small groups that are not affiliated with the LDS Church continue to practice
polygamy in Utah. The number of polygamists in the state is estimated at thirty thousand.
65. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a member of the Fundamentalist
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints for unlawful sexual conduct and bigamy ( State
v. Holm, 2006 Utah 31,137 P.3d 726 (Utah 2006).

